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Introduction 
The science of economics has become an increasingly important 
influence on daily life. Families, religious leaders, politicians and 
many others have been forced to become familiar with concepts such as 
inflation, the retail price index, capital investment, value added and 
output. Industries, and those who work in them, are now often judged 
by their economic importance and contribution to gross domestic pro-
duct. In Scotland, only a few decades ago, the coal, steel and ship-
building industries were paramount; if you worked in these indus-
tries you enjoyed esteem in your local community. 
In the Scotland of 1982 that is not generally the case. It is 
the bankers, the solicitors, the electronics engineers and even the 
economists who lay claim to pre-eminence. Their industries do not ne-
cessarily contribute substantially to Scotland's economic output but 
they seem to highlight the decline in many of our traditional indus-
tries. 
There can be little doubt that the fishing industry, one of the 
country's first 'traditional' industries and with a commercial history 
of many centuries, has suffered substantial decline in recent years 
but, unlike coal, steel and shipbuilding, it has managed to maintain 
its high political profile and in many coastal communities fishing is 
still admired and fisher folk occupy important social positions. Clear-
ly, there is something about the industry and the fisheries which 
transcends the narrow disciplines of finance and economics. 
This chapter attempts an appraisal of the Scottish fishing in-
dustry in the early 1980's, from both economic and political perspec-
tives. What has gone wrong? Why? What can be done over the next few 









spction provides a brief description of the industry in 1982. This 
is followed by sections on recent history and the reasons for the 
marked decline. There are then sections on EEC policy and the admin-
istration of the Scottish fisheries, followed by conclusions. The 
intention is neither to provide a detailed history nor economic in-
vestigation, both of which are available elsewhere, but an objective 
assessment of the industry's current state. 
The Industry in Scotland 
A brief description may be helpful. The industry is not homogen-
eous and there are important structural and regional differences. A 
common distinction is made by size or length of vessel, with four dis-
tinct groups being identified: distant water, middle or near water, 
inshore and shell fishing. This ignores much of the static gear in-
dustry (e.g. the salmon fisheries at the mouths of rivers) and river 
and sport fishing. As a rough rule of thumb the vessels engaged in 
the distant water fisheries are usually trawlers in excess of 110 feet 
in length, with crews of around 20, and are away from port for around 
three weeks per trip. The middle or near water vessels are generally 
seine netters of between 40 and 110 feet, with crews of up to 10 and 
are away from port for a few days at most and usually just overnight 
or for a single day's fishing. Thirdly there are the smaller vessels 
which do not venture far from shore and finally the shell fishing part 
of the industry. 
The trawlers and seine netters have traditionally been catchers 
of white fish, with cod, haddock, whiting, lemon sole and such like 
being the main species. By geographical definition, the distant water 
grounds have been foreign, such as offshore Iceland, the Farces and 
Norway. In contrast the seine netters' area has generally been within 
UK waters, particularly since the advent of the 200 mile limit. A 
separate group of vessels, normally over 40 feet in length, have con-
cerned themselves with the pelagic fisheries (herring, mackerel, etc.) 
which are much more mobile than the demersal fisheries, although in 
recent years there has been an increasing tendency to switch from 
one type of fishing to another. Similarly, the shell fisheries can 
generally be regarded as a distinct group within the industry, as 
can be salmon fishermen and the new generation of fish farmers. 
Table 1 shows the number of vessels registered in Scotland 
176 
sincp 1976. Figures for lORl and J082 are not available yet. The 
table shows that about 55% of all vessels are under 40 feet in length 
but they account for a small proportion of total catches (less than 
10%) and the main commercial fisheries involve the larger boats of 
over 60 feet. 
TABLE 1 
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* of the 82 vessels 80 feet and over in 1980: 34 were trawlers, 4 
were seiners, 39 were purse seiners and 1 scallop dredger 
The regional distribution of the industry in Scotland is imp-
ortant and there are various ways of considering this - for example 
by the home ports of the fishermen/vessels or the port of landings. 
There are significant differences but Table 2 gives the distribution 
of landings (by volume and value) in 1980, which is the latest year 
for which the retailed figures are currently available. The values 
are at the time of first sale and the landings are from both UK and 
foreign vessels. In 1980 they totalled over £113 million and this ex-
cludes the subsequent value added in processing, distribution and re-
tail sale, so ultimately we are concerned with one industry with an 
output in 1980 of around £500 million. By way of comparison, the est-
imated output or gross domestic product of Scotland in 1980 was 
£16,600 million, so the fishing industry accounted for about 3%. 
From Table 2 it can be seen that the East Coast ports account 
for about 70% of landings by value, the West Coast ports about 28% 
and Shetland about 2%. Scotland has a very decentralized and wide-
spread pattern of fishing ports: the 1980 Scottish Sea Fisheries 
Statistical Tables (SSFST) list 40 ports with more than ten vessels 
and altogether there are 65 listed ports, which is a considerable 
number for a country with a population of five million and 9,000 
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fishermen. Many of the smaller ports are little more than landing 
quays and harbours where boats stay overnight but nevertheless they 
reflect a very dispersed pattern of fishing. 
By the value of landings in 1980, Peterhead was clearly the num-
ber one port in Scotland with a total in excess of £33 million, com-
pared with £18 million in Aberdeen, £7 million in Fraserburgh and 
£6.7 million in Ullapool. By volume, Ullapool was the largest port 
in 1980 and the change in rankings is explained by the fact that the 
great bulk of landings there was of mackerel, which is a relatively 
low value species. In terms of the number of registered vessels, 
Fraserburgh was the largest port in 1980 with 133 boats but many of 
those either fish off the West Coast (landing in Kinlochbervie or 
Lochinver for example) or land in Peterhead or Aberdeen because of 
the better prices and facilities there. The main geographical changes 
over the last few years are outlined in the next section. 
The industry is largely concentrated in the Grampian and High-
land regions, Argyll and the Shetland islands. This is not to ignore 
its importance for communities elsewhere in Fife (e.g. Pittenweem), 
Tayside (e.g. Arbroath), other parts of Strathclyde (e.g. Ayr), the 
Orkney Islands and the Western Isles, but is essentially a North of 
Scotland industry. From a political perspective, it is interesting 
to note that this area was the springboard for the SNP revival in the 
1970's and Liberal MPs such as Jo Grimond and Russell Johnston have 
long represented fishing constituencies, so the two main UK political 
parties, Conservative and Labour, are not generally regarded as the 
parties of the fishing industry. The tendency of fishing communities 
to vote for the smaller parties may well help to explain the common 
view in the industry that it is politically weak and that many of the 
problems of recent years are attributable to a failure to influence 
decision makers in London and Brussels. This is in marked contrast to 
the position in Norway where fishermen are politically very important 
and strong. The validity of the Scottish views are discussed in the 
penultimate section of this chapter. 
The administration of the Scottish industry is in the hands of 
the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland (OAFS), part 
of the Scottish Office, and the Sea Fish Industry Authority (SFIA), 
which is the successor to the old White Fish Authority and the Herring
TABLE 2 
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Source: Scottish Sea Fisheries Statistical Tables, 1980 
Industry Board. These two bodies are responsible for the implementa-
tion of policy and increasingly that is coming from Brussels rather 
than Westminster, particularly in price support and related financial 
matters. 
Recent History 
The industry has undergone many changes over the last few years. 
By nature the fisheries are cyclical but there have also been major 
structural changes and certainly over the last three or four years 
there are signs that a long term decline has set in, which requires 
major action if it is to be reversed. 
Table 3 provides an overview since 1946. Value comparisons are 
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marked decline in the volume of landings, particularly of the pelagic 
species such as herring. In terms of volume the 1980 landings in Scot-
land were only 84% of those in 1976. The herring catch has fallen from 
111,000 metric tonnes in 1946 to 73,000 tonnes in 1976 and only 22,000 
tonnes in 1980. Mackerel show the opposite trend, increasing from only 
2,400 tonnes in 1946 to 101,300 tonnes in 1980 but the mackerel fish-
ery is much less valuable than the herring. 
TABLE 3 
QJANTITY AND VALUE OF PRINCIPAL SPECIES LANDED 












































































The demersal catch has also fallen substantially in recent years, 
with the 1980 1andings only 72% of the 1976 level. The fall in the 
haddock catch is particularly noticeable although it remains, after 
mackerel, the second most important species by volume. Over the last 
ten years the shell fish catch has grown significantly, although the 
upward trend is disguised in Table 3 because the 1980 level was down 
on previous years. 
In terms of value the demersal fisheries remain by far the most 
important for the Scottish fleet, accounting for nearly 75% of the to-
tal 1980 catch, compared with 17% for shell fish and 9% for pelagic 
species. The nominal value of landings has increased steadily but in 
real terms is, for example, for all fish the average landed value per 
tonne in 1973 was £.121.5, in 1976 £.284.1 and in 1980 £.305.9. For 1980 
the breakdown by species was £.377.6 per tonne for demersal, £82.6 for 
peligic and £.702.7 for shell fish. However, in real terms the picture 
is very different. In index number form, for all fish landed, if we 
set 1973=100 the 1980 value is only 65.0 and if we set 1977=100 the 
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]980 value is only 67.3. In other words, in real terms there has been 
a 35% fall in the value of landings in Scotland since 1973. Even in 
nominal figures, landings in 1979 (£344.3 per tonne) were more valuable 
than those in 1980 ~305.9 per tonne). Thus one of the main features of 
the industry in the latter half of the 1970's was a decline in the 
real value of landings. 
In part this may explain the slight fall in the numbers of Scott-
ish registered vessels shown in Table 1 but a more distinct feature is 
the change in the fleet structure. The number of vessels over 100 feet 
in length fell from 46 in 1976 to 25 in 1980 and since most of these 
are trawlers, there has therefore been a major contraction in that part 
of the industry. This is discussed in the next section. Of the other 
length groups, there have been small growths in 60-110 feet groups 
and small declines in those under 60 feet. 
There has also been a small reduction in the number of fishermen, 
from 8,866 in 1976 to 8,699 in 1980, equivalent to about 0.5% per year. 
One implication of the differing levels of decline must therefore be 
that fishermen's earnings have fallen substantially in real terms and 
in 1980 even in money-of-the-day values. There is little firm evidence 
for this because such statistics are either not collected or (in the 
case of the Inland Revenue) not published but a small annual sample of 
vessels' earnings undertaken by the Department of Agriculture and 
Fisheries for Scotland (OAFS) suggests that a marked fall has occurred. 
Preliminary results show that 1981 and 1982 have seen a slight im-
provement, but earnings are still well below the levels achieved in 
the first half of the 1970's. 
As a consequence the industry has been forced to approach the 
Government for special aid and that has indeed been forthcoming, al-
though probably not on the scale the fishermen would have liked to 
see. Traditionally the main financial aid to the industry has been by 
way of grants and loans for the purchase of new vessels and the modern-
isation of existing levels, with the old White Fish Authority and the 
Herring Industry Board (now the Sea Fish Industry Authority) being 
the administrators of the schemes, except in the area of the Highlands 
and Islands Development Board. Assistance for harbour improvements, 
fish markets and other infrastructure has come from DAFS for agreed 
schemes and in recent years the EEC has contributed to these schemes 
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and the vessel assistance, in much the same way as UK regional policy 
now operates. 
However, the UK Government has provided ad hoc aid in recent 
years. The rationale for the provision of operating subsidies has been 
that the fleet needed support for its day-to-day operations, while 
its structure and efficiency were being improved by the grant and loan 
schemes. Thus they have been regarded as temporary, short-term assis-
tance. The subsidies were discontinued in 1973 when the fisheries im-
proved but were given again in 1975. In 1980 a subsidy of £3 million 
was agreed for the UK fleet, with about £1 million used to finance 
exploratory trips for new species, with most of the remainder going 
to support market prices by producers' organisations. A second sum of 
£14 million was paid directly to the fleet in the autumn of 1980 on 
the basis of vessel length and this criterion was used again in alloc-
ating £25 million of aid to the UK fleet in 1981. 
This assistance has been for the UK industry but given that Scot-
land accounts for about 55% of the UK fleet and 60% of UK landings it 
is likely that the Scottish industry has received a similar proportion 
of the aid. At the time of writing, two applications for additional 
money are being considered by the Government - for the catching and 
processing sectors - but in these cases there is doubt that they will 
be approved. Certainly the ad hoc nature of this assistance and the 
criteria used for its allocation do not fit in with a long term poli-
cy of assistance for restructuring. 
Table 2 showed the geographical distribution of landings in Scot-
land in 1980. Recent years have brought major geographical changes in 
the industry. It is possible to make a fairly clear distinction-be-
tween herring/mackerel ports and white fish ports, and ports have tra-
ditionally been regarded as one or the other. To the extent that di-
fferent facilities are required for the landing and onshore treatment 
of different species, and that to a lesser extent the types of vessel 
differ, ports have tended to specialise and therefore many of the 
changes in the role and importance of ports are a consequence of 
changes in the nature and volume of landings. 
If we take the pelagic sector first, as shown above there has 
been a very sharp fall in herring catches, particularly since 1977, 
although the volumes in 1970 already were a small proportion of those 
caught earlier in the century. Thus traditional herring ports such as 
Mallaig, Kyle of Lochalsh, Oban and, in earlier times, Wick have de-
clined. To some extent the more modest increases in mackerel catches 
have compensated for the rollapse of the herring and have allowed 
Ullapool (the centre of the West Coast mackerel fishery) to become 
the largest port by way of volume of landings in 1980 (although a 
high percentage of the catch is merely transhipped but registered as 
being landed). Overall, though, there has been a marked restructuring 
of port activities on the West Coast. 
The changes on the East Coast are more attributable to changes in 
the pattern of demersal fishing. As explained earlier, the changes in 
the stocks and composition of catches have not been as great as for 
pelagic species, and the onshore implications have been relatively 
less evident. The most noticeable feature has been the decline of the 
middle and distant water trawler ports of Aberdeen and Granton. The 
latter has virtually disappeared as a fishing port and no trawlers now 
fish from it on a regular basis. The decline in the Aberdeen trawler 
fleet has been even greater in actual numbers, although the port re-
mains one of the leaders in Scotland. 
Some of Aberdeen's problems relate to the movement of many sein-
ers to Peterhead because of the high landing costs in Aberdeen im-
posed by the obligatory use of dock labour to land catches (Aberdeen 
is the only fishing port in Scotland which is a registered dock labour 
port and this creates problems for the fishing fleet). Attempts have 
been made on a number of occasions to exclude fishing vessels from 
this scheme and it may well be that a solution will be found in the 
near future through deregistration for the fishing fleet, in which 
case it is likely that a number of vessels will revert to landing in 
Aberdeen. 
Some of the other changes are attributable to the now common 
pattern of certain East Coast boats, particularly those from the Moray 
Firth ports, fishing permanently off the West Coast and landing their 
catches in Kinlochbervie and Lochinver, although retaining their re-
gistration in the East Coast ports. This has resulted in a significant 
switch in landings despite little change in vessel registrations. 
During the 1970's there have also been periods when "tripping" 
has been popular, i.e. the practice of boats travelling to relative-
ly distant ports to land catches in order to obtain higher prices. 
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This has been particularly true or the Shetland fleet fishing in the 
waters around Shetland but travelling to Aberdeen or Peterhead to 
land there before returning home to continue fishing. The extra fuel, 
time and other costs are more than offset by the higher prices avail-
able in the distant ports. 
On to this pattern or fundamental reorganisation with the pelagic 
and demersal sectors has been added the almost uninterrupted growth in 
the shell fisheries which by their nature are very local and have 
brought a modest but widespread increase in activity to many small 
ports. This is also true, although to a much smaller extent, or the 
growth in fish farming on the West Coast or Scotland, which in some 
cases has been introduced in areas with no fishing traditions. The 
trout, salmon and other farmed fish are occasionally sold at the local 
markets and processed locally. 
Mention should be made or the new port at Breasclete in the West-
ern Isles. Developments there are closely linked with the processing 
plant set up with financial assistance from the HIDB, but more gener-
ally Breasclete represents an attempt to set up a major new fishing 
port on the West Coast or Lewis. Although growth there has not been 
up to the expectations or the Board and other interested parties, it 
may occur in the long run ir the marketing or new species such as blue 
whiting becomes commercially worthwhile. 
Finally, changes in the ports need to be seen in the wider con-
text of other port users. Although shipping traffic in Scotland has 
declined for many years, recent changes in relative transport costs 
suggest that there may be a resurgence in waterborne traffic. In addi-
tion, many fishing ports have other functions, and these may also have 
changed over the last decade. 
The main change has undoubtedly been the advent or North Sea oil 
and gas. Quite a rew East Coast ports have become important oil supply 
bases, notably Aberdeen, Peterhead, Lerwick, Montrose and Dundee. 
This has brought both benefits and costs. The benefits include in-
creases in traffic and income for the harbour authorities. The costs 
include competition for facilities, such as quay space and repair 
facilities, and higher running costs. It is probably fair to conclude 
that most or the problems have diminished with time and in particular 
the construction or purpose-built facilities for the oil industry. 
For example, in both Aberdeen and Peterhead there are now separate 
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areas for oil vessels and the fishing industry, although in the small-
er ports the necessary investment for such separation has not been 
justified. 
llllapool, the main port in terms or the volume of landings, is 
the mainland terminal for the ferry service to and from the Western 
Isles {Stornoway being the island terminal). Aberdeen and Lerwick are 
the terminals for the Shetland ferry service, and other ports on the 
West Coast have similar functions. Montrose and Inverness have impor-
tant timber export trades, Ayr is a major general cargo port and some 
other ports have significant coastal traffics. In some cases these 
other activities are more important than the fishing industry. 
Reasons for Decline 
It has not escaped the notice of many fishermen that xhe current 
recession in the industry began shortly after the UK joined the EEC 
and that the subsequent experience has been more or a long term de-
cline than the cyclical fluctuations which are inherent in fisheries. 
The failure of member countries to agree on a common fisheries policy 
has created considerable disenchantment. However, it would be both 
naive and misleading to blame the EEC for many of the current problems 
or the industry in Scotland. Before sensible policies can be formulat-
ed to try to solve these problems, a better understanding of the 
causes is needed. At present there appear to be quite a few misunder-
standings. 
Clearly the decline in catches and landings is a major cause and 
for that there are two underlying reasons - the loss of fishing grounds 
and the overrishing of certain species. Regarding the former, all EEC 
countries have been adversely affected but none as much as the UK. 
During the late 1970 1 s most countries with coastlines extended their 
territorial waters to 200-mile limits and with them their jurisdiction 
over fisheries. Previously limits had traditionally been six or 
twelve miles. The process meant that the UK lost access to grounds 
which had been fished by the distant water fleet for many years. 
The outstanding example was Iceland which had been popular with 
generations of trawlers from Fleetwood, Grimsby, Hull and other ports. 
Although the 'cod war' with Iceland began in the 1950's the turning 
point came in 1975 when Iceland declared a 200-mile limit and banned 
UK and other foreign vessels from fishing there. Subsequent agree-
ments have allowed limited access but nowhere near the pre-1975 scale. 
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The Aberdeen trawler fleet suffered from the loss o£ Faroese grounds 
and various parts o£ the UK fleet found their activities restricted 
o££ Canada, Norway and elsewhere. 0£ course, Aberdeen has benefitted 
from the discovery o£ offshore oil and gas so the effects o£ the de-
cline there have been mitigated which is not the case with the other 
trawler ports. 
These foreign grounds were the major source o£ cod, haddock and 
plaice. Although the UK followed suit with a 200-mile limit (less 
in the North Sea because o£ the proximity o£ other countries) this 
was only a minor compensation because these species are not nearly 
so prolific in UK waters. Furthermore, the distant water trawlers 
were forced to fish in areas for which they were not well suited, 
resulting in poorer catch rates and higher costs. 
The second main reason was the overfishing of species such as 
herring and sprats. British vessels landed 146,000 tonnes o£ herring 
in UK ports in 1970. In 1976 the volume was 91,000 tonnes, in 1977 
43,000 and in 1980 a pitiful 5,500 tonnes. During the last few years 
the UK Government has had to impose serious bans on the fishing o£ 
herring in order to try to give stocks a chance to rebuild. Similar, 
though less severe, restrictions are now in foroe for cod, haddock, 
whiting and mackerel. Unfortunately, the main conservation method 
used is the imposition o£ quotas, which, as argued below, is a very 
inefficient system and has caused significant inequalities among the 
domestic fleet. Mention should also be made of the ban on the fishing 
of Norway pout in the area west of the Shetlands (the 'pout box'), a 
measure declared illegal by the European Court in 1980. 
Fish stocks £~uctuate for biological and other reasons from year 
to year and from area to area. Most demonstrate cyclical patterns but 
the recent experience with herring, cod and others is quite different.
It is clear that the scientists and the fisheries advisory bodies set 
some of the suggested total allowable catches at far too high levels. 
It is equally clear that many countries ignored these suggested catch 
limits and allowed their fishermen to damage stocks by overfishing. 
Furthermore, until the advent of the 200-mile limits and also the 
EEC, countries had no adequate means of properly managing the re-
sources. 
A related problem has been the over-expansion of catching capa-
bility. In 1970 there were 2,617 registered vessels in Scotland. By 
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1Q74 this number had risen to 2,754,since when it has fallen to 2,514 
in 1980. There has been a sharp fall in trawlers, e.g. vessels in the 
110-140 feet range totalled 43 in 1976 and 25 in 1980 and there are 
now no Scottish vessels over 140 feet in length. In contrast there 
has been growth in the number of seiners. 
Thus the number of vessels has not fallen in line with landings. 
Indeed, there have been marked improvements in catching technology 
and new vessel efficiency over the last decade, such that catching 
capacity has increased by between 35% and 40% since 1970. Much of 
this was encouraged by generous grants and loans from the central 
government bodies responsible for the industry and the Highlands and 
Islands Development Board (HIDB). 
In recent years these bodies have reduced their financial assist-
ance for new vessels but the real damage was done in the period 1965-
75 ~ some of the expansion was little short of irresponsible. At 
least it can be said in support of the HIDB's policies that there was 
a case for a geographical redistribution of fishing effort and that, 
for many of their communities,the fisheries offer (or offered) the 
best economic prospect. In any case the result has been that there 
is now chronic overcapacity in the UK and Scottish fleet and that re-
presents probably the major challenge for EEC policy. 
Too many fishermen and too few fish mean low incomes. The finan-
cial problems were discussed in the preceding section but two points 
need to be made here. The first is that costs have risen substantially 
over the period under consideration and at a rate greater than the 
average inflation rate. Two o£ the main expenditure items are fuel 
oil and interest on loans, and the costs of these have risen markedly 
in recent years because of the OPEC oil price rises and UK economic 
policy. 
The second point is that there are serious deficiencies in the 
selling and marketing of £ish which have had a downward effect on the 
prices which consumers are willing to pay. Generally, fish has a poor 
image, in comparison with red meat and chicken for example, and the 
new SFIA has not set an improvement in image as one of its main pri-
orities. Data for 1980 and 1981 are not available yet but according 
to the 1979 National Food Survey, the household consumption of fish 
in Great Britain was 4.51 ounces per person per week in 1979 compared 
with 5.35 ounces in 1970. In Scotland the decline was even greater, 
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from 4.88 ounces in 1970 to 3.86 ounces in 1979. (The reason for the 
surprisingly lower level of consumption in Scotland compared with GB 
is that more fish is eaten outside the house, e.g. from fish and chip 
shops, and is therefore not covered by the survey). This change in 
tastes obviously has to be reversed if a marked improvement in prices 
is to be attained. 
Finally, there is the question of imports which have grown stead-
ily, for example from 140,000 tonnes in 1960 to 175,000 tonnes in 1970 
and nearly 370,000 tonnes in 1981. In 1960 they accounted for 14% of 
the total supply of fish in the UK. By 1970 this share had only risen 
to·lS% but in 1980 it was 33%, with the bulk of the growth occurring 
since 1977 and coinciding roughly with the fall in domestic landings. 
Fishermen and their representative organisations have complained bitt-
erly about the depressing effect some imports have had on fish prices 
and hence earnings. This view has not been unanimous because some pro-
cessors and consumer groups have generally welcomed the imports. Un-
til recently, the rise in the value of sterling appeared to be the 
main reason for the sharp rise in imports, particularly from Canada 
and Norway. In regard to imports from other EEC countries a major con-
tributory factor is the artificial exchange rates applied to trans-
actions by the producers' organisations (POs) which means that French 
fishermen, for example, can get better prices in the UK than at home. 
Current EEC Policy 
The justification for a common fisheries policy originates from 
the Treaty of Rome. Article 38(1) states that 'the Common Market shall 
extend to agriculture and trade in agricultural products. Agricultural 
products means the product of the soil, of stock-farming and of fish-
eries and products of first-stage processing directly related to these 
products.' Thus the general objectives in Articles 38 to 43 on agri-
culture apply also to fisheries. 
Cynics have claimed that there was little interest in fisheries 
in Brussels until the UK applied for membership. Certainly, the devel-
opment of the common agricultural policy (CAP) proceeded independently 
of legislation on the fishing industry, which did not arise in any im-
portant form until 1970. Regulations 2121/70 and 2142/70, passed in 
October 1970, laid the framework for a common fisheries policy, by 
establishing a common structural policy for the industry and a common 
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organisation of the market in fishery products. They require that 
Community fishermen have equality of access to fishing grounds in 
the maritime waters under the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the mem-
ber countries. 
As a transitional measure, exceptions to this general rule were 
allowed for certain coastal areas dependent on the fisheries and these 
were to be within a three-mile limit from the shore and for a period 
not exceeding five years, during which period steps were to be taken 
to protect these areas from any difficulties arising from the concept 
of open access. These regulations were amended by the Act of Accession 
in 1972 when the UK became a member of the EEC. Chapter 3 of the Treaty 
of Access deals specifically with fisheries. Article 100 authorises 
member states to restrict fishing in waters under their jurisdiction 
within a six-mile limit to 'vessels which fish traditionally in those 
waters and which operate from ports in that geographical coastal area. ' 
Article 101 extends the six-mile limit to twelve miles in certain areas. 
These include areas in the UK. Certain 'special fishing rights' - to 
fish for particular species in designated areas - held by other member 
states in January 1971 were preserved. These exceptions are allowed 
until the end of 1982. 
In 1976 the EEC maritime countries agreed jointly to adopt 200-
mile fishing limits in the North Sea and the North Atlantic and the 
UK duly did so with effect from the 1st January 1977. This had the 
effect of regulating the access of third countries' vessels to EEC 
waters but did not affect the rights of vessels from other EEC coun-
tries to fish in UK waters. 
Regulation 2142/70 established a common organisation of the mar-
ket in fishery products. It provided for an intervention price system 
operated by recognised producers' organisations. 'Official withdrawal 
prices' are fixed by Council, and, if fish fail to reach these prices 
when sold, it is withdrawn and compensation paid by the Community. 
Producers' organisations may fix higher autonomous withdrawal prices 
which are supported by their own funds. 
The other regulation, 2141/70 laid down 'a common structural po-
licy for the fishing industry', which is in fact the embryo of the 
common fisheries policy (CFP) now struggling to be born. The regula-
tion did not introduce a comprehensive internal regime for the Comm-
unity but the key features were that: 
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(a) 'Rules applied by each member state in respect of 
fishing in the maritime waters ••• shall not lead 
to differences in treatment of other member states' and 
(b) 'Member states shall ensure in particular equal condi-
tions of access to and use of the fishing grounds.' 
In constructing a CFP the EEC Commission has endeavoured to in-
troduce other management and conservation measures, so far with lim-
ited success. The outstanding difficulty concerns catch levels. The 
Commission formulates total allowable catches (TAC's) on the basis of 
international scientific advice. Agreement on these was reached in 
1980 although in 1981 there were disagreements about the volume of 
herring fishing permitted. No agreement has been reached on the dis-
tribution of these catches among member states. 
Regarding the UK, in January 1978 ministers of the other eight 
member states agreed informally on measures proposed by the Commi-
ssion which would have given 31% of the overall TAC to the UK. The 
British fishing industry has consistently taken the view that the UK 
should be allocated a share of at least 45%, approximately composed as
regards species and areas. In support of this claim, it is pointed out
that (excluding the Mediterranean) about two-thirds of the catch av-
ailable in EEC waters is in fact taken from within the UK's 200-mile 
limit. 
New Commission proposals on TAC's and country shares were put 
forward in 1980 and 1981 but so far the UK Government has refused to 
accept them. At the time of writing the disagreements have continued 
throughout 1982 and it could well be that the deadline of the end of 
1982 is reached without any agreement. It is not clear what would 
happen to fishing limits and access arrangements in such a situation, 
and Scottish fishermen are genuinely afraid of the consequences of a 
'free for all'. 
Administrative changes 
1982 has been an unusually active year on the administrative 
front. At the government level there have been important personnel 
changes at DAFS, notably the retirement of John Cormack who had been 
the Under-Secretary for many years. Both the White Fish Authority and 
the Herring Industry Board were wound up towards the end of 1981, 
again with the retirement of senior officials. The new SFIA has taken 
a very different approach to its responsibilities, with a strong em-
phasis on marketing, and although it is too early to judge the appro-
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priateness of many of the changes made, it was evident that changes 
were needed. 
The growth of officially recognised producers organisations has 
continued and there are now five in Scotland, operating mainly on a 
regional basis. The largest one, the Scottish Fishermen's Organisation, 
has had severe financial problems because of misjudgements over pur-
chasing and pricing policies, which led to the departure of the chief 
executive. Not all vessels are members of PO's and the consequences 
of incomplete coverage are exercising a great deal of political att-
ention. It is probably fair to conclude that most fishermen are scep-
tical of the pricing policies of the PO's and that the main reason 
for their growth has been the relatively low levels of open market 
prices. 
Beneath these levels are various voluntary associations, repres-
enting the political and other interests of members, and these are 
organised either on a regional or structural (i.e. pelagic, white fish, 
static gear) basis. The two main bodies are the British Fishing Fed-
eration, representing the trawling fleet, and the Scottish Fisher-
men's Federation, representing the inshore fleets. Both have done a 
tremendous amount of work in Scotland and have excellent reputations 
in the industry. However, 1982 has been a difficult year for them. 
With the collapse of the Aberdeen trawling fleet there is not 
really a role for the BFF in Scotland and in future it is likely to 
become a purely English organisation. The SFF has lost a lot of its 
unity because of inter-regional and inter-type arguments. It is also 
in the process of reorganisation, including the move of its head 
office from Aberdeen to Edinburgh and the retirement of its president, 
Gilbert Buchan, who for many years has been "the voice" of the Scott-
ish industry (and has done a tremendous job as such). Indeed, one of 
the outstanding features of the voluntary bodies in Scotland has been 
the ability and dedication of the senior officials and office bearers. 
Conclusions 
There is little doubt that the last few years have been the worst 
for the fishing industry in postwar Scotland and 1982 has been no ex-
ception. The immediate future looks little better. It will take con-
siderable time to replenish overfished stocks and reduce the number 
of vessels and fishermen to sensible and viable levels. Substantial 
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financial assistance will be necessary during this period. There is 
little danger that this will continue to be in the form of inefficient 
subsidies provided on the ad hoc basis, which may be inevitable and 
acceptable for the short-term. However, a sensible long-term strategy 
is essential and there has been little evidence of that on the part 
of the UK fisheries authorities since 1978. The need to reduce the 
fleet is the outstanding example. 
Most of the industry's problems are unrelated to UK membership 
of the EEC and therefore some of the criticisms of the common fisheries 
policy are inappropriate and unfair. That is particularly true of the 
marketing policy, although there remains scope for improvement. With-
out such a policy prices and earnings would probably have been lower 
and certainly more unstable. In turn, that suggests a need for a great-
er consumer input into the decision-making process in Brussels. On the 
assumption that the domestic EEC market will be fairly static in fu-
ture, it also suggests a need for developing new markets e.g. for 
dried fish products in Africa and Asia, and there EEC trade negotia-
tions can have a substantial influence. Expansion of opportunities in 
these areas would enable the Community to show positive benefits from 
a CFP to offset the negative aspects. 
The main problem with the CFP is the issue of allocating catches 
from EEC waters among member states. This article has tried to show 
the reasons for the UK's continued rejection of the Commission's pro-
posals and provide a perspective for reaching an acceptable share. 
The political situation in the industry is such that the UK Gov-
ernment cannot back down and the solution must lie therefore in other 
compensatory features. Here, the opportunities for the EEC are sub-
stantial, particularly in relation to conservation, fleet reductions 
and licensing. If the opportunities are taken, the eventual common 
fisheries policy could be very worthwhile. 
The key objective must be a reduction in the fleet, in Scotland 
and throughout the EEC, on a sensible and fair basis. Unfortunately 
there is little indication on the part of the authorities that they 
will adopt such a policy. The SFIA and the HIDB continue to give 
grants and loans for new vessels when the money involved would be 
better used in buying out the surplus ~apacity. 
Ex-colleagues from Aberdeen University and I have used a com-
puter model constructed by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
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Food (MAFF)(l) to analyse the pattern of fishing effort needed to 
catch any given set of UK allocations of fish, while departing as 
little as possible from the historic pattern of effort. In terms of 
actual 1979 catch data, we estimate that the landings could have been 
achieved with about 33% fewer vessels (measured in tonnage)( 2 l. An 
estimate of excess capacity of this magnitude does not seem unreason-
able, in view of the fact that between 1970 and 1979 the capcaity of 
vessels over 40 feet rose by more than 1%, as measured by potential 
fishing days, while landings fell by nearly 18%. 
A second analysis tried to calculate how many days of fishing 
effort would have been required for the UK flee• to have caught the 
fish provisionally allocated to the UK by the Community in December 
1980, i.e. the proposed quota of 36% of the major species. Applying 
the quotas to TAC's gives the estimates of fish to be taken in 1981. 
Excess capacity was estimated at 29% in terms of tonnage and 30% in 
days of fishing effort. (The reduction in excess capacity from the 
1979 estimate is attributable to the decline of the trawler fleet 
since then.) 
There are two ways of eliminating redundant capacity. One is to 
increase the catch possibilities by increasing the assumed UK quota 
(or by finding new species). To bring the UK fleet into full-capacity 
use would require an increase in the UK quota to nearly 54%. The 
second method of eliminating or reducing redundant capacity is to 
dispose of it by the scrapping or laying up of vessels. Financial in-
ducements would be necessary. A Commission paper in 1980 suggested a 
level of 300 EUA (European units of account) per gross registered 
ton, at which level the cost in the UK of buying out our estimated 
20,000 tonnes surplus capacity would be about £3.7 million (end-1981 
prices). This is likely to be much too low and effective compensation 
will probably have to be at least three times that. 
Nevertheless, the EEC are perfectly right in pressing for fleet 
reductions and it is to be hoped that this will form an integral 
part of a CFP. Norway has a similar scheme which has been reasonably 
succPssful with generous payments. Subsequently, a licensing system 
for vessels would have to be introduced in order to control future 
fishing effort. Only vessels with licences would be allowed to fish 
for particular areas. 
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oured to protect their interests by formulating local fishing plans. 
There have now been six such studies in Scotland - for Shetland, Ork-
ney, the Western Isles, Highland Region, the Clyde Estuary/West of 
Scotland and the Grampian Region. All the plans have similar elements, 
including the licensing of vessels and preferential treatment for lo-
cal fishermen. Given the importance of the industry in these communi-
ties, their objectives are understandable but in most cases the plans 
make neither economic nor biological sense. Indeed, there are much 
better ways of achieving the objectives, in the broader context of a 
Scottish or EEC framework.( 3 ) 
Nevertheless, the studies contain a considerable volume of use-
ful information and will have had a beneficial effect if they influence 
positively the eventual EEC decisions on the preferential rights of 
coastal communities. 
The fragmentation of the Scottish industry is to be regretted, 
particularly of the political bodies. They have been very influential 
to date and any further diffusion of views is likely to weaken the 
strong stand of the UK. A successful conclusion of the EEC negotia-
tions would bring about a major improvement but, as argued above, that 
alone will not solve the problems of having too many vessels. There 
are also serious difficulties in the fish processing sector and the 
marketing of fish, and these require solutions at the Scottish or UK 
levels. If solutions can be found, we shall probably find ourselves 
with a smaller but efficient and profitable industry. Indeed, there 
can be little doubt about the industry continuing to contract and it 
is the efficiency and profitability aspects which are open for negotia-
tion. 
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